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DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A

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SUBJECT: AMB BRIEFS U.S. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO DEBY ADVISOR;
ADVISOR REQUESTS INFO ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT

REF: NDJAMENA 00119

11. (SBU) This message is an action request. See para. 5.

12. (SBU) Implementation of the Dakar agreement has not advanced and Khartoum continues to instigate violence in both Chad and Sudan, Presidential Advisor on International Affairs Yousef Abba Saleh told Ambassador Nigro on March 28, 2008. Referencing the Sudanese military's bombing campaign in Darfur and its efforts to undermine the effectiveness of the UN-AU peacekeeping force by rejecting certain troop contributing countries, Saleh called for determined international condemnation of Sudan's actions and for the strengthening of EUFOR and UNAMID's mandates to control cross-border activity. He also blamed Khartoum for using the "Janjaweed" to augment Chadian rebel forces intent on overthrowing President Deby's Government.

13. (SBU) Ambassador Nigro expressed U.S. agreement with Saleh's analysis and said that the USG is pursuing a three-track diplomatic strategy to promote peace in the region. First, the U.S. has asked both Sudan and Chad to cease support for rebel groups and has put Khartoum on notice that the international community expects it to abide by the Dakar agreement and will hold it accountable if rebels topple the Chadian Government by force. Second, the U.S. is working toward coordinated action within the UN Security Council to address Chad-Sudan tensions. Third, U.S. officials in Sudan, Chad, and Washington have spoken directly to Chadian and Sudanese rebel leaders to press them to disarm and to engage in peace negotiations with their respective governments. "This situation cannot be resolved with arms but through a political path," said Ambassador Nigro. He added that the U.S. supports Chadian Ambassador Bachir's recent indication that Deby intends to constitute a new, more inclusive government and understands that Chad hopes to advance an "internal dialogue" with opposition elements. Saleh expressed appreciation for the U.S. approach.

14. (SBU) Saleh informed Ambassador Nigro that President Deby wished to see him within the next week. He also reiterated Chad's interest in purchasing C-130s from the U.S. Since the visit of Deputy Secretary Negroponte in May 2007, the U.S. has not provided an

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update on the possibility of this sale, noted Saleh. Ambassador Nigro replied that the U.S. is examining Chad's request and that there is at least a two to three-year delay in delivery of C-130s. He reminded Saleh of General Ward's suggestion, during his July 2007 visit to N'djamena, that Chad consider purchasing C-27s and promised to provide the Government with more details on these aircraft.

Action Request

15. (SBU) As Ambassador Nigro is leaving on official travel on the evening of March 29, he may meet with President Deby earlier the

same day. President Deby is likely to inquire on the status of the C-130 purchase. Post requests: A) The Department provide specifications on the C-130 versus the C-27 in relation to Chad's legitimate need for military transport aircraft; estimates of the delivery dates for both aircraft; and the cost of both aircraft as soon as possible and B) If C-27s will not meet Chad's legitimate needs in lieu of C-130s, the Department assist in suggesting to the Chadians a suitable alternative. End action request.

NIGRO